

# Decoding Barriers: Identifying Disparities in Routing Security Adoption

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DEEPAK GOUDA

ROMAIN FONTUGNE

CECILIA TESTART



# INTRODUCTION

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- Internet routing infrastructure
- Critical vulnerability - for 40+ years
- Why is it important now?

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**Media Contact:**  
MediaRelations@fcc.gov

**For Immediate Release**

## **FCC CHAIRWOMAN PROPOSES INTERNET ROUTING SECURITY REPORTING REQUIREMENTS**

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# INTRODUCTION

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- Internet routing infrastructure
- Critical vulnerability - for 40+ years
- Why is it important now?
- Potential solution (RPKI)
- Our empirical studies
  - Incentives to adopt RPKI
  - Hurdles faced in adoption



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
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
# BORDER GATEWAY PROTOCOL (BGP)

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
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
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
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
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# RESOURCE PUBLIC KEY INFRASTRUCTURE

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
 Cryptographic records mapping networks to IP addresses




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
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
# RPKI ADOPTION TREND



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## **BARRIERS**

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- Knowledge
- Coordination
- Historical

## **DRIVERS**

- Security
- Economic
- Community

## BARRIERS

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
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
- Security
- Economic
- Community

# WORLD TREND


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
# EUROPE & MIDDLE EAST



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


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





# US & CANADA




# ARIN VS OTHER REGIONS



# ARIN - LARGE VS SMALL NETWORKS ADOPTION




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
**Knowledge Barrier**

# ECONOMIC DRIVER




# COORDINATION BARRIER

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**Complex Hierarchy**




**Direct Hierarchy**

# CONCLUSION

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
- RPKI adoption has increased 4-fold over the last 5 years
- The adoption is not uniform
- We discover several disparities - geographical and network characteristics



# CONCLUSION

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- The adoption is not uniform
- We discover several disparities - geographical and network characteristics



Thank You!

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# Backup Slides


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# ECONOMIC INCENTIVE

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
<b>BGP.Tools</b>	<b>ROA%</b>	<b>ASdb</b>	<b>ROA%</b>
Government	4.88	Government <sup>10</sup>	14.86
Academic	28.54	Colleges <sup>11</sup>	28.46
Mobile Data/Carrier	44.24	Phone Provider	27.65
Server Hosting	45.61	Hosting <sup>12</sup>	56.66
Home ISP	53.49	ISP <sup>13</sup>	42.12
Satellite Internet	79.66	Satellite Comm.	89.26

# HISTORICAL ASPECTS




# AFRICA

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


**Knowledge Barrier**

# TRANSITION 2019-2024



Number of AS in each category



Amount of prefix space originated by ASes in each category